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The Gissel Bargaining Order: Is Time a Cure-All?
The National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA" or the "Act")
was enacted. to protect and legitimize unionization among the American workforce.' The heart of the Act is section 7 which grants
workers the right to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining. 2 The underlying
premise upon which the NLRA rests is that of free choice and
majority rule for workers deciding whether or not to unionize.' There
are, however, instances where these time honored principles, the very
underpinnings of our national labor policy, are minimized or blurred
beyond recognition. A prime example of such an instance is the
imposition of an order to bargain: a National Labor Relations Board
("Board") or court enforced remedial mandate that effectively thrusts
unionization on both the employer and worker, at times, without
regard to ascertaining the true wishes of the majority at the time the
4
order issues.
The landmark case dealing with bargaining orders is NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co.,' where the United States Supreme Court ap-

1. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) as amended by Pub.
L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947 and Pub. L. No. 257, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68, F.C.A. 29 §§ 151-88. (the "NLRA"). The purpose
of the NLRA is found in § 1, entitled "Findings and Policies," and provides, in
pertinent part: "[Tihe denial by some employers of the right of employees to
organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce. .. " Id.
2. Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any and all such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in § 8(a)(3)."
Id.
3. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). "Our own review of the
statute, its legislative history, Board and court precedent, and legal commentary
have convinced us that the majority rule principle is such an integral part of the
Act's current substance and procedure that it must be adhered to ....
Id. at 583.
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. L.B. Foster, Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB
v. Wilhow Corp., 666 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1981).
5. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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proved the utilization of a remedial bargaining order in situations
where an employer refuses a union demand for voluntary recognition
based on signed authorization cards and conducts itself in such a
manner that the Board's election process is contaminated and the
holding of a fair election is unlikely. 6 According to Gissel, "the key
to the issuance of a bargaining order is the commission of serious
[employer] unfair labor practices that interfere with the election
processes and tend to preclude the holding of a fair election." ' 7 The
Gissel Court defined and delineated its reference to "serious unfair
labor practices" by setting forth three distinct levels of employer
misconduct categorized according to severity.' Level I misconduct,
the most severe, is found "in exceptional cases marked by outrageous
and pervasive unfair labor practices." 9 Of less severe nature is Level
II misconduct which exists "in less extraordinary cases marked by
less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to
undermine majority strength and impede the election process." 10
Finally, Level III misconduct is defined as "minor or less unfair
labor practices [which have] minimal impact on the election machinery. ... "" If an employer is found to have committed unfair labor
practices rising to either Level I or Level II, the issuance of a
bargaining order is appropriate, despite the fact that the union may
have lost the representation election.12 However, if the misconduct
6. Id. at 614-15. The bargaining order is an appropriate remedial tool where
the Board "finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of
ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though
present, is slight and that the employee sentiment once exposed through cards would,
on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should
issue ... ." Id.
7. Id. at 594.
8. Id. at 613-15.
9. Id. at 613.
10. Id. at 614.
11. Id.at 614-15.
12. The justification for an order to bargain with a labor union either outside
the election process or subsequent to a union loss of an election lies in the language
of the NLRA. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of § 9(a)."
Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part: "Representatives designatedor selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. .. " (emphasis
added).
Therefore, since a labor union can obtain exclusive representation status under
the Act by being designated as such by the majority, outside the election process,
an order to bargain with the union is simply a confirmation of the majority rule
principle as once expressed through signed authorization cards. 395 U.S. at 597.
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at issue is limited to Level III, the use of traditional remedies is the
proper course rather than the imposition of an order to bargain. 3
The remedial aspects of a bargaining order are axiomatic. Severe
acts of employer misconduct, such as widespread discharges for union
activity, plant closings and the like, have the effect of negating the
probability of a fair election or injecting into the election process a
high degree of fear and intimidation so as to distort the results of
any election.1 4 Therefore, as long as the union is able to show that
it did, in fact, possess signed authorization cards from the majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit which designated it as the
exclusive representative, the bargaining order merely fulfills the wishes
of that majority. 5 As a result, the bargaining order acts retrospectively to grant the wishes of the then majority in total disregard of
the employer's acts of misconduct and the effect of those acts.
However, a retrospective bargaining order also ignores events that
may have transpired between its issuance or enforcement and the
point in time at which the employer misconduct occurred. Therein
lies the crux of the controversy that has divided the circuit courts of
appeals.
This comment will explore judicial treatment of the effect of events
subsequent to an employer's unfair labor practices as they pertain to
the propriety of a retrospective bargaining order and the principle
of majority rule inherent in statutory and decisional labor law. The
critical inquiry will focus upon subsequent events which may tend to
lessen the significance of authorization cards signed by a former
majority, improve the probability of holding a fair election, or which
may force unionization upon employees, the majority of whom may
not wish such representation.
Serious concerns arise with the use of retrospective bargaining
orders. For instance, given the administrative and judicial maze of
hearings, counterclaims, findings and appeals, 6 is it proper for a
13. Id.at 615.
14. See supra note 4.
15. See supra note 12. But see Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982),
where the National Labor Relations Board interpreted Gissel not to require a
preliminary showing of majority strength prior to the issuance of a bargaining order
for Level I misconduct. However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court denied
enforcement. 114 L.R.R.M. 3169 (1983). The Board subsequently reversed its stance
in Conair by holding in Gourmet Foods that a preliminary showing of majority
strength was required before a bargaining order would issue regardless of the level
of misconduct involved. 270 N.L.R.B. at 583.
16. Section 10(e) of the NLRA grants the Board the power to petition the
appropriate court of appeals for enforcement of its orders. Section 10(f) of the
NLRA allows "[Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board" to petition
the appropriate court of appeals to modify or set aside such order.
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court to enforce an order to bargain where the misconduct at issue
occurred two or three years in the past? Moreover, if the particular
unit has experienced significant employee' turnover during protracted
litigation, does enforcement of an order to bargain actually fulfill
the wishes of the new majority or, in effect, is the order forcing
unionization on employees who neither signed authorization cards
nor participated in the organizational campaign? If the employer
misconduct stemmed from the actions of a particular supervisor,
would the subsequent termination of that supervisor tend to make
the holding of a fair election likely and thus, militate against the use
of a bargaining order?
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel, there have been a
myriad of cases requiring answers to these questions. However, the
issue of subsequent events is unsettled and remains a topic upon
which courts are divided. 17 The Board, however, has consistently
taken the position that the propriety of issuing a bargaining order is
to be determined as of the time of the unfair labor practices and
that subsequent events such as those listed above are entirely irrelevant to that determination; moreover, the Board has called upon the
Supreme Court to "resolve the conflict."'"
Ostensibly, the Gissel opinion seems to approve Board policy in
this regard. In validating the use of bargaining orders, the Gissel
Court stated: "We have long held that the Board is not limited to
a cease-and-desist order in such cases, but has the authority to issue
a bargaining order . . . even where it is clear that the union, which
once had possession of cards from the majority of the employees,
represents only a minority when the bargaining order is entered."' 9

17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Willow Corp., 666 F.2d at 1304; NLRB v. Pilgrim
Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 120 (1st Cir. 1978).

18. Chandler Motors, Inc. & Amalgamated Local Union 355, 236 N.L.R.B.
1565 (1978). In Chandler Motors, the Board issued a retrospective bargaining order
while, at the same time, acknowledging the split between Board policy and the
policy of various circuit courts.

"With all deference to the court, we believe that the administration of the
Act, for which we are responsible, requires that we await a final disposition
by the Supreme Court of the issue in order to resolve the conflict with other
circuits on this important issue. We wish to make it clear that our adherence
is intended as nothing more than respectful disagreement with the view of the
Third Circuit on the matter [in NLRB v. Armcor, Ind., 535 F.2d 239 (3rd
Cir. 1976)] and an attempt to protect, until the conflict is resolved by the
Supreme Court, what we consider to be a substantial legal issue."
Id at 1566 n.8.
19. 395 U.S. at 610.
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However, crucial to the resolution of this precise issue is whether
the Gissel Court, by its use of the word "minority", contemplated
only a unit consisting of the original card signers whose vigor and
manifestation of union support has dissipated, or whether the word
also embraces a unit of new employees who were not a part of the
initial organizational effort. If the term is limited to only the original
unit, a bargaining order would satisfy the desires of the then majority
once expressed through authorization cards, but which may now be
suppressed by employer intimidation. However, if the term also
extends to a unit consisting of a new majority-by virtue of employee
turnover, genuine issues are raised with respect to the principle of
majority rule.
The Gissel Court held that if traditional remedies could erase the
past effects of employer misconduct and ensure a fair election, a
bargaining order should not issue. 20 Those who oppose the Board's
belief that subsequent events are irrelevant argue that if the unit
consists of a new majority, untouched by the employers past unfair
labor practices, traditional remedies are appropriate. 2 ' Proponents of
Board policy, however, maintain that without the forcefulness of a
bargaining order, the effects of the employer's past misconduct would
linger to the point where the new majority, even if it desired union
representation, would not risk the consequences of supporting organizational efforts. 22 Additionally, proponents argue that without
the bargaining order, an employer would be free to meet future
organizational attempts with the very same types of misconduct that
poisoned the prior attempt, thereby creating a perpetual cycle of
union avoidance.

23

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld the Board's policy that
subsequent events are irrelevant in determining the propriety of a
bargaining order. In NLRB v. L.B. Foster, Co., 24 the court upheld
the Board's setting aside the election results and imposing a bargaining order, issued after the union lost the representation election. 25
The employer argued that the order should not be enforced because
three years had passed since the misconduct and employee turnover

20. Id. at 614.
21. See Pilgrim Foods, 591 F.2d at 120.
22. See Willow Corp., 666 F.2d at 1305.
23. See L.B. Foster, Co., 418 F.2d at 5. See also The Exchange Bank v.
NLRB, 732 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1984).
24. 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969).

25.

Id. at 4.
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had significantly changed the voting unit. 6The court conceded that
the voting unit may be entirely new, but noted that "[T]o appraise
'27
the problem in light of subsequent events is wholly unrealistic.
Thus, in enforcing the Board order to bargain, the Ninth Circuit
held: "We do not think that these facts permit us to refuse to enforce
the Board's order. The delay is not the fault of the union; if it is
anyone's fault, it is that of the employer." ' 28 The court then noted
that Gissel did not mandate consideration of subsequent events and
that to require such consideration would allow an employer to avoid
its duty to bargain by continually creating new sets of facts for
adjudication.29
The Seventh Circuit was another early proponent of Board policy.
In New Alaska Development Corp. v. NLRB,30 the court expressly
rejected differing viewpoints and aligned itself with the Ninth Circuit."' However, more recent opinions of the Seventh Circuit indicate
a willingness to at least consider subsequent events in limited instances. For exanple, in Peerless of America, Inc., v. NLRB,3 2 the
court reversed a Board finding of Level II misconduct and held the
employer's unfair labor practices rose only to Level III in severity. 3

26. Id. The employer showed that nine of the eighteen workers employed on
October 31, 1966 had been lawfully terminated prior to December 20, 1966, the
date of the election. Moreover, only five of the remaining nine workers voted in
the election which the union lost by a vote of 3 to 2. Id.
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. Id. at 4. Accord NLRB v. Tri-State Stores, Inc., 477 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.
1972). In enforcing the Board's order to bargain as of the time of the unfair labor
practices, the court said that "employers would gain a great incentive to refuse to
recognize a bona fide bargaining demand in hopes that a delay would terminate the
difficulty." Id. at 207.
29. 418 F.2d at 5. In NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 550 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1977), the court held that passage of time, per se, was insufficient to
warrant a new election. In enforcing a bargaining order for misconduct that had
occurred five years prior, the Ninth Circuit stated: "the appropriate time for
determination of the propriety of a bargaining order relates back to the time when
the case arose before the Board." Id. at 1153. However, with respect to subsequent
employee turnover, the Ninth Circuit has retreated somewhat from such a rigid
approach.
In NLRB v. Western Drug, 600 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1979), the court held that
a "perfunctory conclusion" that a bargaining order should issue may operate to
deny present employees a freedom of choice in representation status and, therefore,
the impact of employee turnover in the voting unit should be considered relevant
in determining the appropriateness of a bargaining order. Id. at 1326.
30. 441 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971)."
31. Id. at 493.
32. 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 1119.
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Therefore, the bargaining order did not issue because Level III
34
misconduct is substantively insufficient to support such an order.
However, in dictum, the Seventh Circuit noted that substantial employee turnover in the voting unit may be relevant in determining
the propriety of a bargaining order. 35 Then, in NLRB v. Century
Moving & Storage, Inc. ,36 the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of
a Board order to bargain because the employer had offered reinstatement to discharged employees.37 Although not central to its holding,
the court also cited significant employee turnover in the voting unit
38
as support for its decision.
The Tenth Circuit has also adopted the Board policy concerning
the irrelevancy of subsequent events. In NLRB v. Wilhow Corp.,a9
the court upheld a bargaining order based on Level II misconduct. 4°
The court focused primarily upon the "potentially lingering effects"
of the employer's discharge of leading union activists. 41 The court
stated that it would view an order to bargain as the appropriate
remedy wherever a discharge for union activity was found. 42 Thus,
even though only one of the original twelve card signers was still
employed in the voting unit at the time of enforcement, the Tenth
Circuit assessed the propriety of the bargaining order solely at the
43
time of the misconduct and in consideration of its lingering effects.
The District of Columbia Circuit has likewise followed Board
policy. In St. Francis Federation of Nurses & Health Professionals

34.

Id.

35. Id. at 1121. "Since it is the present workforce that stands to be deprived
of exercising its free choice in the preferred election process, the fact that it is
substantially different from the one which existed at the time of the misconduct
militates against issuance of a bargaining order where, as here, that drastic remedy
is not otherwise clearly warranted." Id.
36.

683 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1982).

37. Id. at 1097.
38. Id. at 1094. "Bolstering our decision that the bargaining order is not
appropriate is the fact that of the five employees who signed Union cards, [one]
quit his employment with the Company and [another] is deceased. Changes in the
employee complement may be relevant to the determination of the proper remedy."
Id.
39.
40.
41.

666 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1305.
Id. "The loss of employment due to union activity ...

has a residual

effect on employees and taints the possibility of a free election." Id.
42. Id. at 1304.
43. Id. The employer failed to convince the court that the retrospective
bargaining order would contravene § 7 of the NLRA because only one of the twelve
original signers remained in its employ. Id.
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v. NLRB," the court reaffirmed its prior adoption of the Ninth
Circuit's rationale, albeit not in absolute terms.4 5 The court refused
to impose "a blanket requirement on the Board that it consider
subsequent events before issuing a bargaining order." 46 However,
such a blanket requirement would be imposed, the court stated, in
exceptional cases such as where the employees have clearly indicated
4
that they do not want union representation. 1
Despite significant judicial support for the Board's rationale, several circuit courts of appeals have taken a different approach. More
specifically, these courts have required findings as to why a fair
election could not be held in lieu of the rote imposition of a
retrospective bargaining order. For example, in NLRB v. Pilgrim
Foods, Inc. 48 the Board issued a bargaining order but failed to make
specific findings concerning the impact of the misconduct and whether
such misconduct was likely to recur in the future. 49 The First Circuit
vacated the Board's bargaining order noting that no bargaining order
should issue where "the impact of the unfair labor practices upon
the election machinery is minimal." 50 The court held that Board
orders to bargain unsupported by reasoned analysis could be remanded, but analyzed the enforcement issue itself since it deemed
the Board's findings "inadequate". 5 Turning to the merits of the
case, the court noted that the supervisor responsible for the misconduct, as well as four employees from the original voting unit, were
no longer employed by Pilgrim Foods5 2 Therefore, the First Circuit
held that the residual impact of the unfair labor practices was lessened
by subsequent employee turnover, and that the likelihood of recur53
rence was minimal.
44. 729 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 856.
46. Id.
47. Id. Other such exceptional cases would include extraordinary delays
between the refusal to bargain and the determination of the remedy or a high degree
of employee turnover in the voting unit. Id.
48. 591 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1978).
49. Id. at 119. The court said the Board must determine that the present
employees are so intimidated that they are unable to make a free choice. Id. at 120.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The test applied by the First Circuit in determining the propriety of
a bargaining order is rooted in the language of the Gissel opinion, where the
Supreme Court stated: "In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion,
then, the Board can properly take into consideration the extensiveness of an
employer's unfair labor practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions
and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future." 395 U.S. at 614.
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The Second Circuit has also required specific findings in regard to
subsequent events and the likelihood of a free and fair election.
However, the court has developed a somewhat qualified approach.
In NLRB v. General Stencils,5 4 the Second Circuit remanded the case
to the Board suggesting that it take "additional evidence with respect
to employee turnover . . . or other matter." 55 The court stated that
"[wihile the Board has wide discretion in framing remedies, the
agency has a correlative duty to explain its imposition of a remedy. .... ,,16 One year later, the same court was faced with another
Board decision lacking specific findings. In NLRB v. World Carpets
of New York, Inc.," the court denied enforcement of a Board order
to bargain for lack of specific findings as to why a fair election
could not be held.58 The Second Circuit admonished the Board in a
footnote saying: "We continue to hope that the Board will make a
more meaningful attempt to integrate findings of company misconduct with a reasoned analysis of how that misconduct jeopardized
6
the chances cf a fair election." 9 Then, in NLRB v. Eli Gordon, 0
the Second Circuit reviewed a Board order to bargain relating to a
voting unit that had changed completely after the occurrence of
misconduct. 6' Although the court considered subsequent events to be
relevant, it upheld the bargaining order "because the turnover was
' 62
caused by the Very unfair labor practices sought to be remedied."
It is clear that the Second Circuit does not consider subsequent events
such as total employee turnover or significant lapse of time to be
dispositive of the issue, per se, although these factors are considered
63
relevant.
The Third and Fourth Circuits have also considered subsequent
events relevant. In Hedstrom v. NLRB, 64 the Third Circuit adopted
the approach of the Second Circuit in GeneralStencils65 and remanded
54. 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir, 1971).
55. Id. at 905.
56. Id. Accord NLRB v. Windsor Industries, 730 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1984);
NLRB v. Knogo Corp., 727 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1984).
57. 463 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1972).
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id. supra note 6.
60. 792 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
61. Id. at 34.
62. Id.
63. See also Glomac Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979), in
which the Second Circuit enforced a Board order to bargain even though six (6)
years had passed since the misconduct occurred. Id.
64. 558 F.2d 1137 (3rd Cir. 1977).
65. See supra note 54.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:447

the case to the Board to consider the effects of a three year delay
on the possibility of a fair election. 66 Such a stance was a reversal
of the Third Circuit's prior interpretation of the Gissel decision where
it had considered subsequent events to be irrelevant. 67 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit in General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 6s conceded
that an employer should not profit from protracted delays in litigation, but stated that "the primary purpose of a bargaining order is
not punitive; it is to protect the rights of the employees, and to
insure that their wishes will be carried out." ' 69 Thus, the court
remanded the case to the Board to consider the effects of the
70
subsequent events.
In the aftermath of Gissel, the Fifth Circuit became the leading
7
opponent to Board policy. In NLRB v. American Cable System,
the court twice remanded the case to the Board to consider the "then
existing situation" in regard to the possibility of a free and fair
election.7 2 Like the Second Circuit, however, the Fifth Circuit views
subsequent employee turnover relevant but not a controlling factor
when reviewing the appropriateness of a bargaining order. In Chromalloy American Corp. v. NLRB, 73 the court held that subsequent
events are always relevant, but added that even where substantial
employee turnover in the voting unit had occurred, its impact could
be offset by the employer's past responses to union activity and
existing employee sentiments. 74 Therefore, based upon an employer's
past history of union opposition and its perceived residual effects,
the court could infer that the likelihood of future misconduct is great
and that an order to bargain is warranted despite substantial employee

turnover .7

66. 558 F.2d at 1152.
67. See NLRB v. S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 414 F.2d 561 (3rd Cir. 1969).
The court stated that "employee turnover in the Nichols store since October, 1966
(the time of the refusal to recognize and bargain with the union) would not affect
the power of the Board to issue a bargaining order at the present time." Id. at 565
n.8.
68. 445 F.2d 1350 (4th Cir. 1971).
69. Id. at 1356.
70. Id.
71. 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. Id. at 448. "We think that on remand the Board should have taken the
opportunity to consider the then existing situation at American Cable to determine
whether the electoral atmosphere was still so contaminated that a bargaining order
was then justified." Id.
73. 620 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. Id.at 1133.
75. Id.
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Unquestionably, the two sides of the controversy present serious
and legitimate concerns, the heart of which touch the very foundation
of our national labor policy of free choice granted by Congress in
section 7 of the NLRA. 76 The Ninth Circuit recognized the tension
created by the Gissel opinion in Western Drug,77 where it noted the
"delicate balance between (industrial) stability and freedom of
choice.""8 Those who consider subsequent events irrelevant point to
the time at which the union once possessed majority strength vis a
vis authorization cards and argue that, but for the employer's unfair
labor practices, the employees' free choice would have been expressed
in a victorious representation election or, at the very least, their votes
79
would have reflected a free choice regardless of the election results.
In essence then, the objective sought to be achieved by the proponents
of Board policy is identical to that sought by its opponents. However,
while the proponents seek to protect and foster free choice at the
time of the misconduct, the opponents seek to protect free choice at
the time the remedy is determined. Opponents view the imposition
of a bargaining order without consideration of subsequent events as
a potential deprivation of the current voting unit's right of free
choice.8 0 Thus, the two sides appear to be submerged in a dilemma.'
Complete and unbridled protection of free choice at the time of the
misconduct disregards possible expressions of free choice at the time
of the remedy, and protection of free choice at the time of the
remedy may operate to deny an expression of free choice at the time
of the misconduct.
From the depths of this dilemma, one absolute should emerge. In
all cases, subsequent events should be considered relevant to the
determination of an appropriate remedy because the National Labor
Relations Act is remedial in nature, not punitive.8' Failure to assess

76.

See supra note 2.

77.

600 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1979).

78. Id. at 1326.
79. See supra notes 41 and 42.
80. See supra note 35. In a statement issued to the Washington Daily News,
Senator Robert F. Wagner (N.Y.), sponsor of the NLRA was quoted as saying:

"The majority of criticisms against the National Labor Relations bill spring from
misinformation about its provisions and purposes. First, there is the charge that the

measure would regiment men in national unions. On the contrary, the bill gives
added protection to workers who wish to exercise their free choice to remain
completely unorganized ....
81.

See, e.g., NLRB v. Limestone Apparel Corp., 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.

1982), where a demand for punitive damages was denied; Rayner v. NLRB, 605
F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1982), where make whole remedies incurred beyond the contract
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the significance of natural and uncontrollable subsequent events such
as voluntary employee turnover in the voting unit during the course
of good faith litigation can be viewed two ways: as the protection
of free choice at the time of employer misconduct or as a means to
deter future misconduct by either the employer in question or by all
other employers. If the motivation to issue a bargaining order contains elements of deterrence, the remedy becomes punitive. This
should not occur since the focus at all times should be upon the
protection of free choice and not upon deterring misconduct by
punitive means.
Therefore, when considering subsequent events in formulating an
appropriate remedy, the Board and reviewing courts should adopt a
case by case approach where given facts determine the outcome.
When there is a significant lapse of time between the misconduct
and the remedy due to employer initiated litigation, a threshold
inquiry into the subjective motivation of the employer should be
undertaken. If it be found that such litigation was intended to delay
bargaining and thereby reap the benefits of normal employee turnover
and possible dissipation and frustration of majority strength, such a
finding should be weighed accordingly in fashioning a remedy. However, if the litigation is grounded in good faith, the inquiry should
turn to the employer's subsequent actions, vis a vis possible changes
in the composition of the voting unit or the removal of the impediments which contaminated the electoral process. If the employer has
effectuated changes in the make-up of the voting unit that are causally
connected to anti-union motives, such actions are relevant to and
supportive of an order to bargain. On the other hand, employee
turnover that dissipates majority strength during good faith litigation
which is not caused by anti-union motivation should militate against
a bargaining order. Likewise, where the specific actions of a supervisor poisoned the electoral process without the employer's knowledge
and consent, the fact that the supervisor has left the employer is
relevant and should be weighed accordingly.
Support for the relevancy of subsequent events is found in the
Gissel opinion where the Court stated: "[I]f the Board finds that the
possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a
fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies,

termination date were dismissed as punitive; Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 713 F.2d
823 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where remedies were denied because they were punitive and
designed to deter future violations as their sole basis.
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though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed
through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining
order, then such an order should issue.... ,,s2 Without inquiry into

subsequent events and regardless of the severity of the employer
misconduct, the Board and reviewing courts are unable to fully assess
the possibility of a fair election or rerun prior to the final determination of an appropriate remedy. Therefore, to give substance to the
language of Gissel and to better protect and foster the principle of
majority rule, before a bargaining order should issue, subsequent
events, in all cases, should be considered relevant.
Robert Kennedy, Jr.

82.

395 U.S. at 614-15.

